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MEASURING THE NEPA LITIGATION BURDEN: A 
REVIEW OF 1,499 FEDERAL COURT CASES  
BY 
JOHN C. RUPLE* & KAYLA M. RACE** 
We reviewed thirteen years of National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) litigation data reported by the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality, summarizing 1,499 federal court opinions 
to assess: 1) how frequently NEPA compliance efforts result in 
litigation; 2) how agency NEPA decisions fare in court; and 3) how 
NEPA litigation outcomes compare to outcomes in other challenges 
to federal agency decisions. We found that only one in 450 NEPA 
decisions were litigated and that the rate of NEPA challenges 
declined during the thirteen-year study period. We noted an inverse 
relationship between the amount of time spent on Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) preparation and the likelihood that an EIS 
would be challenged in court. We also found that while federal 
agencies prevail in NEPA litigation at slightly higher rates than in 
other civil cases where the government is a defendant, 
environmental plaintiffs win at higher rates than any other class of 
NEPA challengers. Overall, we conclude that the NEPA litigation 
burden may be overstated because few decisions are challenged in 
court, the rate of challenges is declining, and environmental 
plaintiffs are likely to bring only cases where they have a high 
likelihood of success. We therefore recommend against imposing 
strict deadlines and page limits on EISs, as these “reforms” may do 
little to reduce the NEPA compliance burden while limiting 
opportunities for public engagement. Indeed, aggressive 
streamlining may make it more difficult to satisfy NEPA’s hard-look 
requirement and therefore result in increased litigation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article reviews thirteen years of data reported by the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) on federal court 
2020] MEASURING THE BURDEN 481 
litigation involving National Environmental Policy Act1 (NEPA) 
compliance to determine how often NEPA documents are challenged in 
court and how NEPA documents fare in litigation. Little data exists on 
the number of NEPA analyses conducted annually, or on litigation 
arising from those decisions. Our analysis narrows this gap in the 
literature, and in so doing, illuminates ongoing efforts to improve NEPA 
efficacy and to update NEPA’s implementing regulations.2 We found 
that NEPA litigation does not appear to be unreasonably burdensome, 
and that the rate at which NEPA decisions are challenged has declined 
steadily over time. 
NEPA has been described as the Magna Carta of environmental 
laws.3 NEPA declares that it is national policy to “encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his [or her] environment; 
[and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of 
man. . . .”4 NEPA’s lofty goals are met through requirements that 
federal agencies identify and analyze impacts on the environment prior 
to taking, authorizing, or funding “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”5 NEPA however, “does 
not mandate particular results,” nor does it require agencies to mitigate 
environmental impacts or choose the least environmentally damaging 
alternative.6 Instead, NEPA requires that agencies take a “hard look” at 
the environmental impacts of their actions and consider a range of 
alternative means of achieving agency goals before undertaking federal 
actions.7 Completing this hard look can involve significant time8 and 
expense.9  
Whether NEPA’s environmental benefits justify such 
environmental reviews is hotly contested, and some contend that NEPA 
litigation has been used by environmentalists as a tool to delay much 
 
 1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012). 
 2 On June 20, 2018, the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) pub-
lished an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to NEPA’s implementing 
regulations. Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 28591 (June 20, 2018).  
 3 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2019). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
 5 Id. § 4332(2)(C).  
 6 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
 7 Id. (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)). 
 8 The CEQ reports that, across all federal agencies, completion time for an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS)—from issuance of a notice of intent to prepare an EIS 
through publication of a record of decision—took an average (mean) of 4.5 years and a me-
dian of 3.6 years. One quarter of EISs took less than 2.2 years to complete, and one quar-
ter took more than 6.0 years to complete. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON 
ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TIMELINES (2010–2017) 1 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/VLM8-3E4F [hereinafter CEQ EIS TIMELINES].  
 9 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-370, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 13–14 (Apr. 2014) (citing 
estimates that “an EIS typically cost[s] from $250,000 to $2 million”). 
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needed projects. According to the Heritage Foundation, “[a]ctivists for 
years have used judicial review to challenge (and delay) development.”10 
Staff to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Natural 
Resources asserted that NEPA is the “weapon of choice”—a form of 
“lawfare,” used by activists for the “manipulation of the legal system” to 
“stop, delay, restrict, or impose additional costs on all types of federal 
action.”11 Critics’ concerns often focus on NEPA or NEPA litigation 
allegedly adding cost or time to federal infrastructure projects.12  
While soundbites such as these paint a vivid picture, they are based 
on anecdotal information rather than a systematic review of NEPA 
litigation, and they fail to consider the reasons for project delays, many 
of which have nothing to do with NEPA.13 While we agree that 
efficiencies can be gained with respect to NEPA, we also believe that 
changes to our foundational environmental laws should be based on 
rigorous and comprehensive analysis.  
This Article attempts to elevate the discussion surrounding NEPA 
by empirically evaluating whether NEPA litigation poses an 
unreasonable burden on the federal agencies charged with 
implementing NEPA, or on the federal courts that must resolve NEPA 
challenges. This Article assesses: 1) how frequently NEPA compliance 
efforts result in litigation; 2) how NEPA lawsuits are resolved; and 3) 
 
 10 Diane Katz, Time to Repeal the Obsolete National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 14, 2018, at 6, https://perma.cc/9X6V-B5YL. 
 11 MAJORITY STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 115TH CONG., 
HEARING MEMORANDUM ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE 1–2 (2018); see also 
MAJORITY STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, 115TH CONG., 
HEARING MEM. ON MODERNIZING NEPA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2017) (NEPA “has be-
come a magnet for litigation, with hundreds of NEPA-related lawsuits against the federal 
government filed or open each year”). 
 12 See HEARING MEMORANDUM ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAWFARE, supra 
note 11, at 5–6. Agencies that tend to handle major infrastructure projects such as Federal 
Highway Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration take longer than aver-
age to complete their EISs. See CEQ EIS TIMELINES, supra note 8, at 10; see also discussion 
infra Part IV.B.6. These agencies are also sued less often than their sister agencies. See 
David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in Environ-
mental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 30 (2018) (noting that the Federal Highway Admin-
istration faced only 30% of the EIS lawsuits that would be expected based on its share of 
EISs produced, while the Department of Defense faced only 70% of the EIS lawsuits ex-
pected, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers faced only 50% of the EIS lawsuits ex-
pected).   
 13 See generally, e.g., William Perry Pendley, Mountain States Legal Found., NEPA 
Needs U.S. Supreme Court Intervention, CARE ENERGY COUNCIL (June 23, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/GP2B-TCFV; The Weaponization of the National Environmental Policy 
Act and the Implications of Environmental Lawfare: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. 
Res., 115th Cong. 1, 5–6 (2018) (statement of Melissa L. Hamsher, Vice President, Envi-
ronmental, Health, Safety, and Regulatory, Eclipse Resources Corporation). But cf., LINDA 
LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33267, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: 
STREAMLINING NEPA, at CRS-3 (updated 2007) (explaining that delays may be unrelated 
to NEPA compliance).  
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how NEPA litigation outcomes compare to outcomes in other 
environmental litigation involving the federal government.  
After reviewing thirteen years of NEPA litigation and summary 
data for 1,499 court opinions (published and unpublished) reported by 
the CEQ,14 we conclude that NEPA litigation has not been used 
excessively in order to stop or delay federal decisions. Only a small 
fraction of NEPA decisions result in litigation—approximately one in 
450 decisions are litigated.15 Further, the amount of NEPA litigation 
declined during the thirteen year study period.16 Environmental 
plaintiffs, however, prevail in NEPA claims at a higher rate than other 
plaintiffs,17 and their rate of success when combined with selective 
litigation fillings suggests that these groups are reluctant to expend 
limited resources on weak legal cases. We also found that agencies that 
spend less time on their NEPA analysis are sued at a higher rate than 
their more contemplative counterparts.18  
Part II of this Article provides background on NEPA, NEPA 
litigation, and calls for NEPA reform. Part III describes the main 
sources of data used in this analysis: CEQ’s NEPA production and 
litigation data, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) EIS 
filing data, and data on federal environmental litigation obtained from 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Office. Part IV analyzes that data to assess the 
extent of the burden imposed by NEPA compliance, the extent of the 
burden imposed by NEPA litigation, and how federal agencies fare in 
NEPA litigation. Part V concludes and identifies several NEPA reform 
recommendations.  
II. BACKGROUND 
NEPA is a foundational element of our national effort to protect 
human health and the environment. But where other statutes protect 
specific environmental amenities, NEPA guards the process under 
which federal agencies make decisions affecting the environment, 
guaranteeing the public an opportunity to offer input before those 
decisions are made.19 This review is intended to be proportional to the 
 
 14 See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, NEPA LITIGATION SURVEYS: 2001-
2013, https://perma.cc/J7A4-GTM7 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) [hereinafter NEPA 
LITIGATION REPORT]. 
 15 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.  
 16 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.  
 17 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 27 (noting that environmental plaintiffs 
win 35% of NEPA cases at the district court and 27% on appeal, while other plaintiffs win 
just 16% of NEPA cases at the district court and only 14% on appeal). 
 18 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.  
 19 See Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349–54 (1989) (explaining that 
“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary 
process,” and that the NEPA process ensure that agencies “will carefully consider[ ] de-
tailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees that 
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risk of environmental harm, with the most significant decisions 
undergoing the most rigorous review. The idea is simple, but the 
practice can be difficult to implement. Before evaluating the burden 
imposed by NEPA litigation, this Part provides an overview of the Act 
itself, the litigation that NEPA compliance has spawned, and pending 
calls for NEPA reform.  
A. NEPA Overview 
Under NEPA, “major federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment” must undergo an environmental 
review before those actions can proceed.20 When a federal project’s 
impacts are known to be significant in terms of their context and 
intensity, compliance requires completion of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS).21 EISs are prepared in stages. At the outset of the 
NEPA process, the lead agency publishes a Notice of Intent to Prepare 
an EIS (NOI) in the Federal Register.22 The NOI describes the action 
contemplated, as well as the reasons for the action, and invites public 
comments on environmental issues raised by the proposed action.23 
After receiving and considering public comment, the lead agency 
prepares a Draft EIS analyzing the direct, indirect, and cumulative 
impacts of both the proposed action and one or more alternative means 
of achieving the desired outcome.24 The Draft EIS compares the impacts 
that are likely to result from each alternative to the impacts that would 
result from a continuation of the status quo (the “no action 
alternative”).25 The public is then invited to review the Draft EIS and 
provide comments, which the agency reviews and considers, responding 
as appropriate and revising the EIS where needed before issuing a Final 
EIS and Record of Decision (ROD).26 If significant deficiencies are 
identified in a Draft or Final EIS, the lead agency may prepare a 
Revised or Supplemental EIS.27 
Most federal actions do not involve significant environmental 
impacts and therefore do not require an EIS. NEPA authorizes agencies 
to promulgate regulations specifying “Categorical Exclusions” (CEs)—
categories of actions that the agency determines do not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant impact on the human environment.28 
 
the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play 
a role in both the decision-making process and the implementation of that decision”). 
 20 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).  
 21 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4 (2018).  
 22 Id. §§ 1501.7, 1508.22. 
 23 Id. § 1506.6 
 24 Id. § 1502.14–.16. 
 25 Id. § 1502.14(d).  
 26 Id. § 1503.1, .4. 
 27 Id. § 1502.9(a), (c). EIS naming conventions vary, and for this Article’s analysis we 
treat all but the first iteration of an EIS as a Supplemental EIS.  
 28 Id. §§ 1508.4, 1507.3(b)(1)–(2)(ii).  
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Actions that fall within one of these regulatory CEs can be approved 
without an EIS, provided that the action does not involve “extraordinary 
circumstances.”29 Congress has also created statutory CEs for certain 
types of oil and natural gas development.30 
Actions that fall outside the scope of a CE can avoid preparation of 
an EIS if a federal agency prepares an Environmental Assessment (EA) 
and determines that the proposed action would not cause significant 
impacts.31 If projected impacts are not significant, the agency issues a 
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), the NEPA review process is 
complete, and an EIS is not required.32 Alternatively, the agency may 
issue a “mitigated FONSI,” which includes measures to reduce the 
impact of the proposed project to a level that is not significant.33 If the 
proposed action is determined to have a significant effect, then however, 
an EIS is required.34 Most federal actions do not require completion of 
an EIS because they are authorized in a CE or are determined in an EA 
not to have significant environmental impacts.35  
While the EPA tracks the number of EISs prepared annually,36 
there are no centralized figures on the number of EAs or CEs completed 
each year, and estimates of such numbers vary wildly. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates that 95% of NEPA 
documents are CEs, nearly 5% are EAs, and less than 1% are EISs.37 
Data compiled by the EPA shows that an average of 513 EISs are 
published each year governmentwide.38 Based on GAO and EPA data, 
we can estimate that the federal government issues approximately 
 
 29 Id. § 1508.4.  
 30 42 U.S.C. § 15942(a) (2012).  
 31 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9.  
 32 Id. § 1508.13. 
 33 Id. § 1501.4; Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appro-
priate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated 
Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843, 3847 (Jan. 21, 2011).  
 34 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
 35 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8 (explaining that less 
than 1% of federal actions require an EIS). 
 36 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://perma.cc/6W5S-B3WR (last updated Feb. 4, 2020) [hereinafter EPA EIS Database]. 
 37 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. However, these are rough 
estimates that vary considerably by agency. For example, the GAO noted that the De-
partment of Energy reported 95% of its NEPA documents are CEs, but 2.6% were EAs and 
2.4% were EISs, while the Forest Service reported that only 78% of its NEPA analyses 
were CEs, 20% were EAs, and 2% were EISs. Id. We reviewed NEPA decisions by the Bu-
reau of Land Management and found that 63.1% of their NEPA reviews were documented 
in a CE, 36.5% in an EA, and just 0.4% in an EIS. See infra Part IV.A.1.  
 38 Calculated from data available at EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. This calculated 
average is for the span of years from 2001 through 2013 and reflects both Draft and Final 
EISs. We contacted the GAO and confirmed that the number of EISs reported in their re-
port, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, reflects the total number of Draft 
and Final EISs completed, rather than only Final EISs. 
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48,700 CEs and roughly 2,560 EAs annually, for a total of roughly 
51,300 NEPA analyses each year.39  
B. NEPA Litigation 
CEs, FONSIs, and RODs are all final agency actions and subject to 
federal court review under the Administrative Procedure Act.40 When 
reviewing a NEPA decision, courts consider compliance with NEPA’s 
procedural requirements and whether the agency took the requisite 
“hard look” at likely impacts.41  
There is currently no governmentwide system tracking NEPA 
litigation or its associated timing and costs. NEPA litigation data was 
collected and published by the CEQ from 2001 through 2013.42 With 
limited data to draw from, few scholarly efforts have assessed NEPA 
litigation’s impact on government agencies. The scholarship that does 
exist tends to be limited in the scope of agencies reviewed, the 
timeframe covered, or to other narrow questions. For example, multiple 
studies focus on NEPA litigation at the U.S. Forest Service.43 The Forest 
Service may receive more attention because it manages 192.9 million 
acres of land (roughly 26% of all federal land and over 8% of the entire 
United States) across forty-three states and Puerto Rico.44 The Forest 
Service is also called upon to balance a host of competing uses, from 
logging to endangered species protection.45 These tradeoffs invariably 
leave some stakeholders dissatisfied, and those groups or individuals 
can turn to the courts for redress. Indeed, during our thirteen-year 
study period, Forest Service NEPA decisions were challenged at over 
twice the rate of any other federal agency, and cases involving the 
Forest Service make up over one-third of all NEPA litigation.46  
 
 39 This calculation is based on an extrapolation from the GAO’s reported percentages 
for each kind of NEPA analysis and the number of EISs tracked and reported by the EPA, 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9. Other scholars recently estimated that 
the federal government annually produced 137,750 CEs, 6,820 EAs, and 435 (draft and 
final) EISs for the period of 2008–2015. Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 16–17. 
 40 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990).  
 41 Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
 42 NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 9, at 19–22. 
 43 See, e.g., Amanda M.A. Miner et al., Twenty Years of Forest Service National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act Litigation, 12 ENVTL. PRAC. 116, 118, 122 (2010) (examining NEPA 
litigation in which the Forest Service was a defendant, in lawsuits filed between 1989 and 
2008); Shorna R. Broussard & Bianca D. Whitaker, The Magna Charta of Environmental 
Legislation: A Historical Look at 30 Years of NEPA-Forest Service Litigation, 11 FOREST 
POL’Y & ECON. 134, 135 (2009) (examining the “litigants, success rates, and management 
activities disputed for NEPA litigation involving the Forest Service from 1970 to 2001” 
and examining “differences and patterns in cases . . . among the U.S. District, U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 44 FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LAND AREA OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM 
(2017).  
 45 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2012).  
 46 See infra Part IV.B.6.  
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Other articles focus on the seventeen NEPA cases decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.47 Recent NEPA litigation scholarship focuses on 
the impacts of the political ideology of judges and presidential 
administrations on the outcomes of NEPA litigation, using an 
independently created database of cases from 2001 through 2015.48 
These articles utilize data gathered and coded by the authors or other 
independent sources. We are not aware of any academic articles relying 
on the NEPA litigation data reported by the CEQ, as this Article does.49 
C. NEPA Critics’ Calls for Reform 
Numerous bills were introduced during the 115th Congress that 
would have limited judicial review of NEPA decisions.50 H.R. 527, for 
example, directed that requirements imposed pursuant to NEPA could 
not preclude actions impacting the greater sage grouse, and exempted 
those decisions from judicial review.51 While unsuccessful,52 such efforts 
indicate sustained interest in reducing the NEPA compliance burden. 
Apart from congressional action, Presidential action can influence 
the NEPA process. President Trump issued an Executive Order in 2017 
 
 47 See Richard J. Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme 
Court: A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1510 (2012); 
Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Supreme Court: Reflec-
tions on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 236 
(2012).   
 48 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 7–9. The authors of this article created and 
coded a database of published and unpublished cases issued between 2001 and 2015, 
drawn from PACER and Westlaw. Id. at 66–67. 
 49 In addition to articles examining NEPA litigation, several articles examine the sub-
stantive effects of agencies’ NEPA reviews (prior to and regardless of litigation) on envi-
ronmental outcomes of agency projects and plans. But these articles evaluate only a nar-
row range of agency projects and plans in a limited geographic area. See John Ruple & 
Mark Capone, NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural Mandate: Assessment 
of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39, 39–41 
(2016); John Ruple & Mark Capone, NEPA, FLPMA, and Impact Reduction: An Empirical 
Assessment of BLM Resource Management Planning and NEPA in the Mountain West, 46 
ENVTL. L. 953, 958–59 (2016); Mark K. Capone & John C. Ruple, NEPA and the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 Statutory Categorical Exclusions: What are the Environmental Costs of 
Expedited Oil and Gas Development?, 18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 371, 384 (2017). Other scholar-
ship discusses the procedural efficiencies in the NEPA administrative processes, prior to 
litigation. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 11:1 (2d ed. 2019). 
 50 See, e.g., S. 2068, 115th Cong. § 314 (2017); S. 879, 115th Cong. § 106 (2017); H.R. 
2936, 115th Cong. § 311 (2017); and H.R. 875, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017) (all authorizing the 
Secretary of Agriculture to require arbitration in lieu of judicial review of NEPA Actions); 
H.R. 4423, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); S. 3202, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017); H.R. 4419, 115th Cong. 
§ 4–5 (2017) (all shortening the statute of limitations for challenging NEPA claims).  
 51 Greater Sage Grouse Protection and Recovery Act of 2017, H.R. 527, 115th Cong. 
(2017); see also S. 273, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 52 H.R. 527 (115th): Greater Sage Grouse Protection and Recovery Act of 2017, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr527 (last visited Jan. 31, 2020); 
S. 273 (115th): Greater Sage-Grouse Protection and Recovery Act of 2017, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s273/details (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
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purporting to “streamline” NEPA’s administrative processes by 
requiring, among other things, that EISs be completed in less than two 
years from publication of the NOI.53 Following President Trump’s 
Executive Order, federal agencies signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding to implement the Order,54 and the CEQ published an 
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in anticipation of proposing 
amendments to NEPA.55  
It has been more than thirty years since CEQ’s NEPA regulations 
were last revised,56 and much has changed over the intervening decades. 
We recognize that improvements in NEPA efficacy could be obtained by 
updating NEPA’s implementing regulations. We fear, however, that 
amendments that are not grounded in an understanding of NEPA 
practice may result in changes that could undermine our national 
environmental and public health goals57 while doing little to reduce the 
costs involved in NEPA compliance. The analysis that follows is our 
effort to illuminate the decisions ahead with regard to judicial review of 
NEPA decisions.  
III. DATA 
This Article focuses on federal court litigation challenging NEPA 
decisions. The vast majority of decisions addressed herein occurred at 
the district court level, though appellate litigation, including litigation 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, did occur.58  
While litigation involving NEPA often involves other areas of 
substantive law such as the Endangered Species Act,59 National Forest 
Management Act,60 Federal Land Policy and Management Act,61 the 
Clean Water Act,62 and other statutes, this Article focuses on the 
outcomes of the NEPA claims and does not examine the outcome of 
substantive law claims raised under other statutes. We acknowledge 
 
 53 Exec. Order No. 13807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 24, 2017) (Establishing Discipline 
and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastruc-
ture Projects).  
 54 DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET AL., MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IMPLEMENTING ONE 
FEDERAL DECISION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 13807 (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/WE5Q-U34A. 
 55 Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,591 (proposed June 20, 2018). 
 56 See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable In-
formation, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618 (Apr. 25, 1986) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22). 
 57 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012).  
 58 Little statistical information is available regarding administrative protests or ap-
peals of NEPA decisions, which could precede district court litigation. Administrative chal-
lenges are not addressed in this Article. 
 59 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 60 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a, 521b, 1600, 1611–1614 (2012) (amending Forest and Rangeland 
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974)).  
 61 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2012).  
 62 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012).  
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that it is also possible for an agency to prevail on other grounds only to 
lose on NEPA compliance.63 At the same time, an agency may win on a 
NEPA claim but lose the case because of a violation of another statute.64 
Accordingly, where claims are brought under multiple statutes, 
criticisms focused on litigation may not distinguish between statutes, 
and this could result in overstatement of the NEPA litigation burden, if 
NEPA becomes a surrogate for all environmental laws.65  
A. CEQ NEPA Production and Litigation Data 
Data on NEPA litigation came from reports compiled by the CEQ 
that were published annually between 2001 and 2013. These reports 
“identify the number of cases involving a NEPA-based cause of action, 
federal agencies that were identified as a lead defendant, general 
information on plaintiffs, general information on why litigation was 
pursued, and the outcomes of the cases decided during the year.”66 We 
combined the data from each annual CEQ published report into a single 
spreadsheet in order to track trends over time and analyze averages for 
the thirteen year period.67  
 
 63 See, e.g., Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 831, 849, 
859 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that BLM was successful on its National Historic Preserva-
tion Act claims but lost on NEPA). 
 64 Miner et al., supra note 43, at 122. 
 65 However, one study focused on Forest Service litigation found that only in about one 
in ten NEPA lawsuits did the agency prevail on NEPA grounds while losing on other stat-
utory requirements. Miner et al., supra note 43, at 122. We are not aware of any studies 
testing if this finding holds true across other agencies besides the Forest Service. This 
study examined Forest Service litigation between 1989 and 2008 and found that, in cases 
where the court specifically ruled on a NEPA challenge (as opposed to withdrawals or 
dismissals), the Forest Service “won the NEPA claim, but lost the case because of a viola-
tion of another statute or statutes” in 7.5% of studied cases (or 10.9% of the NEPA wins). 
Id. 
 66 See NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14 (compilation of annual surveys from 
2001–2013). For the individual annual surveys for 2001–2011, see NEPA Litigation Sur-
veys, OFFICE OF NEPA POL’Y & COMPLIANCE, https://perma.cc/V7TE-M5XP (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2020). 
 67 The CEQ’s published reports contained discrepancies in the summary data. We also 
identified gaps in agency-level information on the number of government “wins” and “set-
tlements,” the types of NEPA documents each agency most often saw challenged in court, 
and each agency’s success rates in litigation on each type of document. The CEQ’s pub-
lished reports provided “win” and “settle” data on a governmentwide level, but not on an 
agency level. The CEQ’s published data did, however, include agency-level “losses,” i.e. 
injunctions and remands. See NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. We worked with 
the CEQ to resolve questions regarding the summary data. We also obtained and reviewed 
the CEQ’s raw data, which tracks and codes every NEPA case between 2001 and 2013. We 
ultimately concluded that we could not make agency-level calculations on the type of 
NEPA review at issue in litigation and each agency’s litigation success rates for each type 
of NEPA review. We were, however, able to calculate agency-level numbers of “wins” and 
“losses” generally for all kinds of NEPA litigation using the CEQ’s coding. While we were 
unable to completely reconcile all discrepancies with the CEQ summary data, we believe 
that our final dataset is more than adequate to identify broad trends in NEPA litigation. 
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We used the CEQ data to examine the number of NEPA lawsuits 
filed, the number and types of NEPA documents challenged, and the 
outcomes of NEPA litigation,68 including the number of NEPA lawsuits 
that were disposed of based on the adequacy of an EIS or SEIS.69 These 
results reflect the data as reported by the CEQ and federal agencies.70 
In addition to the data referenced above on NEPA litigation, the 
CEQ recently released a database containing start and end dates for 
1,161 EISs completed between 1992 and 2018.71 Specifically, that 
database includes the publication dates for the NOI, Draft EIS, Final 
EIS, and ROD as well as the amount of time that passed between each 
phase of EIS preparation. We used this data in order to investigate the 
potential relationship between the amount of time spent on EIS 
preparation and litigation.  
B. EPA EIS Filing Data 
The EPA publishes in the Federal Register a notice of availability 
for every Draft, Final, and Supplemental EIS.72 This information is 
stored in an online database that can be searched based on the date of 
the notice, the lead agency responsible for preparing the EIS, and the 
state where the proposed action would occur.73 We used this database to 
determine the universe of Final EISs that would potentially be subject 
to litigation as well as the total number of EISs produced by each 
agency during the analysis period.  
While the EPA dataset provides a complete record of EISs, there is 
not a similar repository of statistics on other types of NEPA documents 
(EAs and CEs). The lack of a centralized repository of NEPA documents, 
or even a record of the number of NEPA actions by agency, is 
problematic because an estimated 99% of all NEPA reviews occur via 
CEs and EAs.74  
Any NEPA reform should begin with an effort to better understand 
the universe of NEPA actions. The BLM’s ePlanning website, which 
includes a database of all BLM NEPA decisions that is searchable by 
 
 68 The NEPA Litigation CEQ Reports refer to this type of data as the “NEPA Case 
Dispositions.” 
 69 The NEPA Litigation CEQ Reports refer to this type of data as the “Basis for NEPA 
Disposition.” 
 70 Although we were unable to independently verify how the CEQ data was coded, we 
used the data as reported by the government. CEQ data was not accompanied by a data 
dictionary, and without a clear explanation of CEQ’s assumptions or methods, we feared 
that our uninformed efforts to recode data could increase rather than resolve coding is-
sues. While errors may exist, we believe that the dataset is sufficient to identify broad 
trends in NEPA litigation. We also believe that relying on CEQ data will serve as an im-
portant complement to other articles that use independently coded data.  
 71 See CEQ EIS TIMELINES, supra note 8.  
 72 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10(a) (2018); see also EPA EIS Database, supra note 36 (containing 
records of all EISs prepared by all federal agencies since 1987). 
 73 EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
 74 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. 
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date, project type, and level of NEPA analysis,75 is an example of a 
positive step in this direction. Reform divorced from a clear 
understanding of the actions being amended is likely to have limited 
benefits and could have unintended negative consequences.  
C. U.S. Attorneys’ Office Federal Environmental Litigation Data 
The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys annually publishes 
statistics summarizing federal litigation involving the U.S. 
government.76 These reports indicate the number of cases involving the 
federal government that were filed, terminated, or that remain pending 
by year.77 Civil litigation involving the United States is further broken 
down by cases in which the federal government is a defendant or 
plaintiff, and by categories of cause of action.78 Relying on this data, we 
were able to quantify the number of civil actions and 
“environmental/lands” civil actions in which the federal government was 
a defendant over the 2001–2013 period. We used this data to determine 
how common NEPA litigation is as a percent of all civil actions filed 
against the United States, and as a percent of all “environmental/lands” 
civil actions filed against the United States.  
Department of Justice statistics also indicate the number of 
judgements for the United States, settlements, judgements against the 
United States, dismissals, and “other” dispositions over the project 
period.79 We divided data for each of these five categories by the number 
of cases terminated in that year to determine the percent of dispositions 
by category. We compared this to the CEQ’s NEPA litigation data to 
assess whether the federal government fares similarly in NEPA and 
non-NEPA civil litigation in which the federal government is a 
defendant.80  
IV. ANALYSIS OF NEPA LITIGATION 
We conducted a historical analysis of NEPA litigation81 in the U.S. 
federal court system that had an outcome or resolution82 between 2001 
and 2013. We also tracked cases that remained pending during that 
 
 75 ePlanning Project Search, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://perma.cc/Z5RS-69QJ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2020) (online National NEPA Register).  
 76 Annual Statistical Reports, OFFICE U.S. ATT’YS, https://perma.cc/8329-LHE6 (last 
updated Sept. 4, 2019). 
 77 Id.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id. 
 80 For purposes of this analysis, we assumed that the federal government was a de-
fendant in all NEPA cases.  
 81 This Article uses the term “NEPA litigation” to refer to cases in which the federal 
government was a defendant and NEPA was a subject of the litigation. 
 82 This includes final rulings as well as settlements and temporary relief such as pre-
liminary injunctions. 
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period. Part A reviews information on the number and burden of NEPA 
documents completed annually. Part B examines the burden of NEPA 
litigation in terms of the frequency with which the government’s NEPA 
documents were challenged in court and which type of NEPA actions 
were most frequently litigated (CEs, EAs, or EISs). Part C examines the 
outcomes of NEPA litigation in terms of the government’s success rates, 
which type of NEPA actions are most frequently upheld, and the 
government’s success in NEPA litigation compared to its success in 
other kinds of litigation. 
A. How Burdensome is NEPA Compliance? 
We considered the burden imposed by NEPA compliance in terms of 
the number of federal actions requiring NEPA analysis annually, and 
the level of NEPA analysis conducted. We were particularly interested 
in the share of actions evaluated in an EIS, the most lengthy and 
expensive process for NEPA compliance. We also examined the time 
required to complete NEPA analyses. We found that the vast majority of 
NEPA decisions do not require completion of an EIS and that the 
number of EISs produced annually has declined steadily. We also found 
that the time required to complete the NEPA review varies by agency 
and that agencies that spend less time on their NEPA analysis are sued 
at higher rates than their more contemplative counterparts. 
1. Number and Types of NEPA Documents Governmentwide 
As noted earlier, the GAO estimates that 95% of NEPA documents 
involve CEs, nearly 5% are EAs, and less than 1% are EISs.83 According 
to EPA data, there were an average of 513 EISs produced annually 
between 2001 and 2013.84 Extrapolating from the number of EISs 
prepared annually, we estimate that roughly 2,560 EAs and 48,700 CEs 
are also prepared annually.85 Draft EISs account for slightly more than 
half of all EISs, at 269 annually.86 Final EISs average 239 annually.87 
The distinction between Draft and Final EIS is important because a 
Draft EIS is not a final agency action and therefore cannot give rise to 
litigation.  
The number and proportion of total NEPA documents are rough 
estimates and actual numbers vary considerably by agency. For 
example, the GAO noted that the Department of Energy (DOE) reported 
95% of its NEPA documents are CEs, 2.6% were EAs, and 2.4% were 
 
 83 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8.  
 84 EPA EIS Database, supra note 36.  
 85 See supra Part II.A. 
 86 EPA EIS Database, supra note 36 (calculated from data available). These estimates 
include Revised and Supplemental Final EISs.  
 87 Id. These estimates include Revised and Supplemental Final EISs.  
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EISs.88 The Forest Service reported that 78% of its NEPA analyses were 
CEs, 20% were EAs, and 2% were EISs.89 Beginning in 2015, the BLM 
began posting its NEPA documents online.90 Based on documents 
published to the BLM’s ePlanning website, the BLM prepared EISs for 
just 0.43% of all of its NEPA documents, or just 67 EISs out of 15,439 
total NEPA documents from 2015 through 2018.91 Over that period the 
BLM relied on EAs 36.5% of the time, and CEs for 63.1% of its NEPA 
decisions.92  
While differences between agencies are notable, it is clear that EISs 
remain exceedingly rare, accounting for a very small percentage of all 
NEPA actions.  
2. EIS Production Trends over Time and By Agency93 
The number of Final EISs94 (including Revised and Supplemental 
Final EISs) produced governmentwide declined over 16% between 2001 
and 2013, from 216 in 2001 to 181 in 2013. The decline, however, has 
not been steady. The number of Final EISs produced peaked in 2004 at 
305, then oscillated over the next several years along an overall 
downward trajectory. The fewest number of Final EISs produced over 
the study period occurred in 2013, with 181 EISs. Final EIS production 
was below the 13-year average in each of the last five years of the study 
period.95 Annual EIS production is shown in Table 1. 
 
 88 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. 
 89 See id.  
 90 See BUREAU LAND MGMT., supra note 75. Unless noted otherwise, we extrapolated 
from the GAO’s figures in order to estimate the BLM’s total NEPA burden. We did not ex-
trapolate from the BLM’s figures because of the short period of BLM data (four years) and 
because we do not know if all BLM NEPA documents were reported on the ePlanning web-
site.  
 91 See BUREAU LAND MGMT., supra note 75. 
 92 See id. Approximately 18% of all BLM NEPA actions were authorized in a “Determi-
nation of NEPA Adequacy,” which documents analysis in a prior NEPA document. Id. De-
terminations of NEPA Adequacy are excluded from the percentage breakdown discussed 
above because they do not represent a new NEPA analysis or decision. 
 93 Data for this section is calculated from EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
 94 We narrow our focus in this section to Final EISs (as opposed to also including Draft 
EISs) because a Draft EIS is not a final agency action subject to judicial review, and 
NEPA litigation is the ultimate focus of this Article.  
 95 We limit our analysis to EISs produced through 2013 to maintain consistency with 
CEQ litigation data but note that the number of Final EISs produced was below the 13 
year average each year from 2014 through 2017. See EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
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216 251 261 305 254 252 260 281 208 248 204 211 181 3,132 241 
Other EISs96 5 5 4 7 5 4 7 1 0 1 2 0 0 41 3 
Total 496 538 581 616 551 551 557 553 464 496 443 419 398 6,663 513 
Table 1: EISs Completed, 2001–201397 
EIS production and trends varied by agency. Among the four 
primary federal land management agencies, the Forest Service produced 
26% of all Final and Supplemental Final EISs governmentwide, 
averaging almost 63 annually. The BLM produced 8.3% of all Final and 
Supplemental Final EISs, averaging 20 per year over the 13-year 
period. The National Park Service (NPS) produced 5.9% of Final and 
Supplemental Final EISs governmentwide, averaging 14.2 per year. The 
Fish and Wildlife Service produced only 2.6% of Final and Supplemental 
Final EISs governmentwide, with an annual average of 6.2 over the 13-
year period.  
As shown in Figure 1, the Forest Service’s production of Final and 
Supplemental Final EISs declined over the study period, falling to 40 
EISs in 2013; well below the 13-year average of 62.7 EISs per year. 
Similarly, the NPS reduced its Final EIS production over the 13-year 
period to 10 in 2013; down from an average of 14.2 EISs annually. In 
contrast, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the BLM both increased 
their Final EIS production over the 13-year period. The Fish and 
Wildlife Service produced an average of 6.2 Final and Supplemental 
Final EISs annually from 2001 through 2013 and completed 10 EISs in 
2013. The BLM completed 19 Final or Supplemental Final EISs in 2013, 
which was down slightly from its average of 19.9 EISs annually, but 
overall, the BLM saw a slight increase in EIS production over the study 
period.  
 
 96 The EPA database included several abbreviations for EIS types (e.g., LF, LD, DD, 
DE, and DF) that we were not confident in recoding. These abbreviation EIS types are 
coded as “other.”  
 97 See EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
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Figure 1: Final and Supplemental EIS Filings  
for the Four Primary Land Management Agencies, 2001–201398 
Overall, the four primary land managers experienced a decline in 
EIS production (R2 = 0.092) over the study period, producing a combined 
total of just 79 Final or Supplemental Final EISs during 2013, down 
from an average of 103 per year.99 While the cause of this decline is 
uncertain, it may be that agencies are becoming more efficient in tiering 
to other NEPA documents,100 a practice that could facilitate the use of 
EAs and Mitigated FONSIs.101 If this is the case, it would appear that 
agencies have become more effective at reducing environmental impacts, 
which is one of NEPA’s primary goals.102 It would also show progress in 
paperwork reduction and reducing delays that result from reducing the 
number of decisions subject to the most demanding level of analysis.103 
 
 98 See EPA EIS Database, supra note 36 (data limited to EISs produced through 2013). 
 99 See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4–.5 (2018) (identifying paperwork reduction and reducing de-
lays as regulatory goals). 
 100 “Tiering” is the practice of covering broader matters in an EIS and incorporating 
that analysis into subsequent NEPA documents by reference in order to focus the subse-
quent analysis. See id. § 1500.4(i).  
 101 A mitigated FONSI incorporates required mitigation designed to ensure that project 
impacts remain below the threshold of significance. See Forty Most Asked Questions Con-
cerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 
18,037–38 (Mar. 23, 1981) (questions 39 and 40). 
 102 R2 is a statistical measure of how much variation in the dependent variable is ex-
plained by the independent variable. For the decline in the number of Final EISs produced 
by the four main land management agencies, annual change explained just 9.2% of the 
overall reduction while explaining 31.9% of the decline by the BLM. See EPA EIS Data-
base, supra note 36. 
 103 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012). Other goals include encouraging public involve-
ment and transparency. Id. 
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3. The Timing of NEPA Compliance 
Timeframes for completing a NEPA review vary dramatically based 
upon the agency and type of review completed. A CE, for example, can 
take as little as one to two days to complete, as reported by the DOE and 
the Department of the Interior’s Office of Surface Mining, while the 
Forest Service reports taking an average of 177 days to complete CEs.104 
EAs take longer to complete, ranging from one month for the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, four months for the Department of Interior’s Office of 
Surface Mining, and 13 months for the DOE, to 18 months for the Forest 
Service.105  
Across all federal agencies, EISs take the longest and have the 
greatest variability in completion times, with a median of 3.6 years and 
an average (mean) of 4.5 years from the time of issuance of an NOI to 
publication of a ROD.106 The fastest 25% of EISs took less than 2.2 years 
to complete, and the fastest EIS completion time overall was one year 
(achieved by 36 out of 1,161 EISs between 2010 and 2017).107 By 
contrast, the slowest 25% took more than 6.0 years to complete, with 
longest overall completion time being over 17 years (experienced by only 
4 out of 1,161 EISs).108 However, this data does not indicate how much 
work was completed before the NOI, whether these timeframes include 
suspensions of work on an EIS, or the reasons for lengthy completion 
times. Many intervening factors are beyond the agency’s control, such as 
changes proposed by the applicant, funding limitations, delays to 
complete required surveys or studies, or shifting federal or agency 
priorities.109 For example, Yucca Mountain, the proposed long-term 
repository for high-level nuclear waste, has been mired in political 
controversy for decades.110 While NEPA analysis for that project has 
languished, these delays appear to say more about scientific uncertainty 
and the underlying political conflict than extreme cases such as this do 
about NEPA, and they may skew average EIS completion times.  
Average EIS completion time also varies considerably by agency. 
The Forest Service had faster than typical EIS completion times, with a 
median of 2.92 years and a mean of 3.35 years.111 The National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was also faster than the 
governmentwide norms for EIS completion, with a median of 2.79 years 
 
 104 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 16. 
 105 Id. at 15–16. 
 106 CEQ EIS TIMELINES, supra note 8, at 4 fig.1.  
 107 Id.  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 2; see also LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33267, THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: STREAMLINING NEPA 8–9 (2007) (discussing sources of de-
lays for federal projects).  
 110 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, LICENSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN 2–3 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/QLQ9-SKVY; see also 153 CON. REC. 5813 (2007) (statement of Rep. Berk-
ley). 
 111 CEQ EIS TIMELINES, supra note 8, at 8 fig.5, 12 fig.6. 
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and a mean of 3.59 years.112 The BLM’s EIS completion time hovered 
around the governmentwide norms, with a median of 3.83 years and a 
mean of 4.41 years.113 The Fish and Wildlife Service had slightly longer 
than average EIS completion times, with a median of 4.23 years and a 
mean of 4.64 years.114 The NPS was in the slowest quartile, with a 
median of 6.35 years and a mean EIS completion time of 6.72 years.115 
Other comparatively slow agencies include Army Corps of Engineers, 
with an median EIS completion time of 5.16 years and a mean of 6.13 
years; the Federal Aviation Administration with a median of 6.63 years 
and a mean of 7.72 years; and the Federal Highway Administration 
with a median of 6.85 years and a mean of 7.3 years.116 
Litigation that follows completion of a NEPA document can also 
add to the time-cost of NEPA compliance. The CEQ’s NEPA Litigation 
Reports, the primary data source for this Article, do not provide 
information on how long individual court cases took. However, a recent 
article on NEPA litigation estimated that the median duration of NEPA 
litigation is 23 months, and 75% of cases were resolved within 3.2 
years.117 For the cases in which the government won, the median case 
only took 1.5 years.118 We have not, however, found data reporting on 
variation in the temporal duration of NEPA lawsuits that distinguish 
between CEs, EAs, and EISs. 
4. EIS Production Time Compared to Litigation Rates 
Professors Adelman and Glicksman recently calculated the ratio 
between the percent of EISs produced by an agency, as a share of the 
total governmentwide number of EISs, and that agency’s share of EIS 
litigation governmentwide.119 This allowed the professors to determine 
the rate at which agencies’ EISs are challenged in court compared to the 
number of EISs they produced. The higher the ratio, the more likely the 
agency is to face litigation over an EIS. The BLM, for example, prepared 
11.6% of all EISs and was the subject of 11.4% of all EIS litigation, 
resulting in a multiplier of one, meaning that the amount of EIS 
litigation faced by the BLM was proportionate to the number of EISs it 
prepared.120 The Forest Service, by comparison, produced 21.7% of all 
EISs and was involved in 30.8% of EIS litigation, generating a 
multiplier of 1.4, meaning that the number of EIS challenges faced by 
the Forest Service was roughly 40% higher than expected based on the 
 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 38. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 30 tbl.1. 
 120 Id. 
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number of EISs the agency prepared.121 Other agencies were sued at a 
rate disproportionate to the number of EISs they produced. As shown in 
Table 2, the Fish and Wildlife Service (the FWS) has a litigation ratio of 
1.8, indicating that they are sued approximately 80% more often than 
would be expected based on the number of EISs they prepare.122 The 
Federal Highway Administration, conversely, has a litigation ratio of 
0.3, indicating that they are sued at about one-third the rate of their 
peers.123  
Based on our examination of Professors Adelman and Glicksman’s 
EIS litigation-ratio data and the CEQ’s EIS production timeline data, 
both described above, we observed that the amount of time spent on EIS 
preparation appears to be inversely related to the likelihood that an EIS 
will be challenged in court.124 For example, the Forest Service spends an 
average of 1.13 years less on EIS preparation and is sued at a much 
higher rate than its sister agencies.125 The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) also proceeds faster than average and is sued at an 
above average rate.126 The Army Corps of Engineers and Federal 
Highway Administration take considerably more time to prepare an EIS 
and are sued at much lower rates.127 Rapid EIS preparation therefore 




















 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 The relationship between EIS preparation time and litigation rates was not statisti-
cally significant (p= 0.2089). The lack of statistical significance was anticipated because of 
the small number of agencies for which we have litigation ratios.  
 125 See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 2. 
 126 FERC’s mean time from the NOI to ROD on an EIS is 2.67 years and its median 
time is 2.29 years. CEQ EIS TIMELINES, supra note 8, at 10 fig. 5, 14 fig. 6. 
 127 See supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also infra Table 2.  
2020] MEASURING THE BURDEN 499 













Army Corps of 
Engineers 89 3.3 0.9 0.5 5.2 0.5 
Dep’t of Defense 
(w/o Corps of 
Engineers) 
76 1.5 1.0 0.2 3.1 0.6 
Dep’t of Energy 16 1.6 0.8 0.2 2.7 0.7 
BLM 128 2.0 1.1 0.3 3.8 1.0 
FWS 40 2.4 1.0 0.2 4.2 1.8 
Fed. Highway 
Admin. 114 3.5 2.1 0.2 6.9 0.3 
Fed. Energy Reg. 
Comm’n 34 1.3 0.5 0.3 2.3 1.1 
Forest Serv. 276 1.4 0.9 0.1 2.9 1.4 
All Agencies 1,161 1.9 1.0 0.2 3.6 1.0 
Table 2: Median Time to Complete an EIS & Likelihood of 
Litigation 2010–2017 
Together the BLM, Forest Service, FERC, Army Corps of 
Engineers, and Federal Highway Administration account for almost 
83% of the EISs for which we have litigation ratio data (see Table 2).129 
We recognize that a number of factors may influence the rate at which 
an agency prepares its NEPA documents, including an agency’s 
approach to NEPA analysis, agency resources, effort preceding 
publication of an NOI, the complexity of projects, and changes 
attributable to a non-agency project proponent. Nonetheless, the 
apparent relationship between rapid EIS preparation time and 
subsequent litigation should caution those seeking to expedite EIS 
preparation. With NEPA litigation taking an average of 23 months,130 
gains in preparation time could be more than offset by litigation delays, 
should litigation occur. An adverse legal ruling will only compound 
those delays. The benefits gained by expediting NEPA may, in short, be 
subsumed by even greater costs associated with NEPA litigation.  
B. How Burdensome is NEPA Litigation?  
We examined the burden posed by NEPA litigation on various 
agencies and the federal government as a whole by analyzing: 1) the 
number of NEPA lawsuits filed annually;131 2) NEPA lawsuit filings 
compared to other civil suits against the federal government;132 3) the 
 
 128 Litigation ratio is the agency’s share of EISs produced (compared to all agencies) 
versus the agency’s share of EIS litigation (compared to all agencies). See supra note 119 
and accompanying text.  
 129 We calculated this by dividing the total number of EISs prepared by these five agen-
cies (641) by the total for the eight agencies specifically listed in Table 2 (773). 
 130 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 131 See infra Part IV.B.1. The data comes from NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 
14. CEQ calls the data on NEPA lawsuits “Cases Filed.” 
 132 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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percentage of all NEPA documents challenged in court;133 4) the type of 
NEPA documents challenged;134 5) the frequency with which EISs and 
Supplemental EISs are challenged;135 and 6) differences in the NEPA 
litigation burden between agencies.136  
We found that very few NEPA decisions are challenged in court and 
that the rate at which NEPA decisions are challenged is declining. We 
also found that NEPA challenges declined faster than the rate at which 
agencies prepare EISs, which is also declining. Additionally, NEPA 
litigation is declining as a percent of environmental litigation against 
the federal government, while general civil litigation against the federal 
government is on the rise. These findings, we believe, call into question 
claims that NEPA litigation is unreasonably burdensome and that 
environmental organizations use NEPA indiscriminately in order to stop 
or delay federal actions.  
1. NEPA Lawsuit Filing Trends Governmentwide 
As noted in Part II.A., we conservatively estimate that the federal 
government prepares approximately 51,300 NEPA documents and 
51,000 NEPA decisions annually.137 Despite the large number of NEPA 
documents, there are on average just 115 NEPA lawsuits filed every 
year governmentwide,138 which represents a litigation rate of 0.22%—or 
roughly one out of every 450 NEPA decisions.  
The number of NEPA case filings is also in decline, with some 
yearly variation. There were 138 NEPA suits filed in 2001, and 96 
NEPA suits filed in 2013. NEPA lawsuits peaked in 2004 at 166, the 
same year as the peak number of Final EISs produced. The fewest 
lawsuits were filed in 2007, with just 86 NEPA lawsuits filed 
governmentwide. While filings varied by year, each of the last five years 
experienced below-average NEPA case filings and a clear downward 











 133 See infra Part IV.B.3.  
 134 See infra Part IV.B.4.  
 135 See infra Part IV.B.5.  
 136 See infra Part IV.B.6.  
 137 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The number of documents and decisions 
differ slightly because more than half of all EISs are drafts and therefore do not reflect a 
final decision. 
 138 Compilation of data from NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. 
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84 74 84 104 69 57 52 72 44 43 55 54 65 857 65.9 
Table 3: NEPA Case Filings 2001–2013139 
 
Figure 2: NEPA Case Filings 2001–2013 
This governmentwide trend in NEPA lawsuit filings represents a 
30.4% reduction over the study period (R2=.6247). NEPA challenges 
involving the four primary federal land management agencies (the 
BLM, Forest Service, Park Service, and the FWS) also declined steadily, 
but at a slightly slower pace, 22.6%, over the same period of time 
(R2=.4392).  
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Figure 3: NEPA Case Filings & Federal District Court Civil 
Filings Handled by the U.S. Attorneys Office 2001–2013 
The decline in NEPA lawsuit filings cannot be fully explained by 
trends in EIS production nor general trends in litigation involving the 
federal government. The 30.4% decline in NEPA lawsuits filed against 
the federal government was sharper than the 16% decline in the number 
of Final EISs produced during the period studied.140 Additionally, the 
30.4% decline in NEPA lawsuits filed during the 13-year study period 
stands in contrast to a 19.5% increase in the number of U.S. district 
court civil cases handled by the U.S. Attorneys Office over that same 
period.141 A complete breakdown of court filings by agency is contained 
in Part IV.B.6. With NEPA litigation declining faster than the rate of 
EIS production and in the face of increased civil litigation, it appears 
that the burden of NEPA litigation is declining.  
2. NEPA Lawsuit Filings Compared to All Civil Suits Against the United  
States  
To understand the relative burden posed by NEPA versus non-
NEPA litigation, we compared the number of NEPA lawsuits filed to the 
total number of civil suits against the federal government.142 As shown 
in Table 4, we found that NEPA litigation represents only 0.043% of all 
civil litigation in which the federal government was a defendant (i.e., 
one out of roughly every 2,500 cases). Further, the last five years for 
 
 140 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 141 See supra Fig. 3. The data comes from: Annual Statistical Reports, supra note 76. 
 142 The data comes from: Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. COURTS 
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which we have NEPA litigation data (2009–2013) all experienced below 
average rates of NEPA litigation. The low percentage of NEPA litigation 
as a share of all federal litigation, when coupled with a downward trend 
in litigation hardly seems to support claims that NEPA litigation 
represents an undue burden for the federal government.  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Fed. Dist. Ct. 
Filings 259,927 256,562 257,234 276,942 245,575 270,171 246,039 265,178 278,884 293,352 289,969 267,990 292,912 3,500,735 
NEPA 
Filings 138 147 140 166 120 108 86 132 97 87 94 88 96 1,499 
NEPA % of 
all Filings 0.053 0.057 0.054 0.060 0.049 0.040 0.035 0.050 0.035 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.043 
Table 4: Civil Litigation with Federal Defendants, 2001–2013 
We also compared the number of NEPA lawsuits to the number of 
civil suits against the federal government that involve environmental or 
lands matters.143 As shown in Table 5, we found that NEPA represents 
12.2% of all federal environmental or lands civil litigation against the 
United States. We also observed a general downward trend in the 
number of NEPA cases as a percent of environmental or lands litigation.  
 





1,807 790 947 978 714 871 767 920 741 942 726 696 1,436 12,335 
NEPA Case 
Filings 138 147 140 166 120 108 86 132 97 87 94 88 96 1,499 
NEPA Cases 
as % of Envtl. 
Matters 
7.6 18.6 14.8 17.0 16.8 12.4 11.2 14.3 13.1 9.2 12.9 12.6 6.7 12.2 
Table 5: Environmental/Lands Litigation with Federal 
Defendants, 2001–2013 
3. Portion of NEPA Decisions Challenged in Court 
Based on our calculations of the number of NEPA documents 
produced144 and the number of NEPA lawsuits filed,145 we estimated 
that, over the thirteen year study period, only about 0.22% of NEPA 
 
 143 Id.  
 144 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 145 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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decisions (or roughly 1 in 450) were challenged in federal court.146 As 
previously noted, this should be viewed as a rough estimate due to 
challenges extrapolating the total number of NEPA documents from the 
number of EISs.147  
The percentage of NEPA reviews challenged in court declined 
slightly over time, as shown in Figure 4, peaking in 2001 with 0.28% of 
NEPA reviews challenged in court and ending in 2013 with 0.24% of 
NEPA reviews challenged in court. The lowest rate of NEPA litigation 
occurred in 2007, when just 0.15% of NEPA decisions faced legal 
challenges. The low rate at which NEPA decisions are challenged, when 
coupled with an overall decline in the rate of challenges, does not appear 
to support claims that stakeholders are overly litigious or that NEPA 
litigation is unduly burdensome.  
Figure 4: Estimated Percent of Final NEPA Decisions Chal-
lenged in Federal Court 
4. Type of NEPA Documents Challenged  
We found that 20.7% of all NEPA cases were resolved on 
justiciability or jurisdictional grounds.148 The CEQ’s data does not 
 
 146 We calculated this by taking the number of NEPA lawsuits filed each year, as re-
ported in the CEQ’s NEPA Litigation Reports and dividing that by our calculated estimate 
of NEPA decisions completed. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 147 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 148 Calculated from the “Basis for disposition” data provided in NEPA LITIGATION 
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delineate which type of NEPA documents were at issue in such rulings. 
Of the cases that survived jurisdictional and justiciability challenges, 
and that were not subject to settlement, 34.2% were resolved based on 
EIS adequacy; 26.6% were resolved based on EA adequacy; 6.4% were 
involved CE adequacy; and 6.7% were resolved on the adequacy of a 
Supplemental EIS.149 Whether NEPA was required at all was the basis 
for determining 5.4% of all NEPA cases that were decided on the merits. 
5. Portion of Final EISs and Supplemental Final EISs Resulting in 
Court Rulings 
We estimated the number of final judgements on Final EISs and 
Supplemental EIS adequacy by comparing the number of Final EISs 
and Supplemental Final EISs produced by all federal agencies150 to the 
number of federal court decisions on the adequacy (or inadequacy) of an 
EIS or SEIS.151 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Total 
















    5.7 11.6 14.6 6.0 10.6 2.2 8.0  0.7 6.9* 
* total based on 2005–2013 
Table 6: NEPA Case Filings Challenging FEISs, 2001–2013 
We found that overall 16.1% of Final EISs resulted in a federal 
court decision based on the adequacy or inadequacy of the EIS.152 While 
 
simply “jurisdictional,” but in examining the raw data we discovered such labels include 
cases that were decided on ripeness, mootness, and standing grounds, in addition to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.  
 149 EISs do not always bear consistent titles, and this analysis refers to all but the ini-
tial iteration of an EIS, whether draft or final, as a Supplemental EISs.  
 150 EIS production data comes from EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. The Database 
contains records of all EISs prepared by all federal agencies since 1987. 
 151 EIS litigation information comes from the “Basis for NEPA Disposition” section of 
the NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. 
 152 This percentage is calculated by dividing the 452 Final EIS litigation decisions by 
the 2,803 FEISs produced. See id. We note that 16.1% does not reflect the portion of FEISs 
challenged, as the CEQ data does not delineate the type of NEPA document in the initial 
filings data nor settlement data. Rather, 16.1% reflects the number of FEISs that that 
were challenged and made it to a court ruling. The number of FEISs that were initially 
challenged but later withdrawn or settled before a court ruling could be higher.  
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this number may appear high, it is important to remember that EISs 
are completed only for the most complicated and impactive 1% of all 
federal actions.153 Further, only 6.9% of Final EISs were held 
inadequate.154 These figures are displayed in Table 6.  
Challenges to Supplemental Final EISs were more likely to be 
resolved based on document adequacy, with 28.9% of such documents 
resulting in a court decision based on its adequacy or inadequacy.155 
Supplemental Final EISs also fared worse in court than Final EISs, but 
were still frequently upheld, with just 15.0% of Supplemental Final 
EISs being held inadequate.156 These figures are displayed in Table 7.  
That Supplemental Final EISs are challenged at a higher rate may 
indicate that errors and omissions in an EIS are uniquely difficult to 
correct, that a flawed analysis invites a higher level of ongoing scrutiny, 
or that projects that require supplemental NEPA analysis involve 
uniquely thorny problems.  
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 




6 7 4 4 7 20 15 9 8 2 7 3 3 95 
% Resolved 
on SEIS  
adequacy 
24.0 25.9 11.4 13.8 28.0 71.4 71.4 29.0 40.0 11.8 41.2 11.5 10.7 28.9 
SEIS 
Inadequate     4 14 9 1 3 0 1 0 0 32 
% SEISs  
Inadequate     16.0 50.0 42.9 3.2 15.0 0.0 5.9  0.0 15.0* 
* total based on 2005–2013 
Table 7: NEPA Case Filings Challenging Supplemental 
FEISs, 2001–2013 
6. NEPA Litigation Burden by Agency 
In addition to calculating the portion of NEPA documents that were 
challenged on a governmentwide level, we also examined which agencies 
 
 153 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 154 Unlike most other figures quoted in this paper, these results reflect only the period 
from 2005 through 2013 because data on the number of EISs deemed inadequate prior to 
2005 was not available. This percentage is calculated taking the number of lawsuits la-
belled by the CEQ as having a court disposition in the plaintiff’s favor based on the inade-
quacy of the EIS (130) and dividing that number by the number of FEISs produced (1,886). 
NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. 
 155 This percentage is calculated by dividing the number of Supplemental Final EIS-
based litigation decisions involving SEIS adequacy (95) by the number of Supplemental 
Final EISs produced (329). Id. 
 156 These results reflect only the period from 2005 through 2013 because data on the 
number of EISs deemed inadequate was not available prior to 2005. The percentage is cal-
culated taking the number of lawsuits labelled by the CEQ as having a court disposition in 
the plaintiff’s favor based on the inadequacy of the Supplemental EIS (32) and dividing 
that number by the number of Supplemental Final EISs produced over the same time pe-
riod (213). Id.  
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were sued most frequently, as displayed in Table 8. Notably, NEPA case 
filings were below the governmentwide average for each of the last five 
years for which reportable data was available.157 Three of the four 
primary land managers (Forest Service, Park Service, FWS) also 
experienced below average NEPA filings during three or more of the last 
five years of record, as did three of the four major agencies that focus on 
infrastructure development (DOE, Federal Highway Administration, 
FERC).158  
Over the 13-year dataset, the Forest Service was the most-sued 
agency for NEPA issues, facing 526 NEPA lawsuits between 2001 and 
2013, averaging over 40 per year. In fact, the Forest Service has been 
sued under NEPA over twice as many times as any other federal agency 
and was responsible for 35% of all NEPA litigation governmentwide.159 
The Forest Service also saw more NEPA lawsuits between 2001 and 
2013 than the next four most-sued agencies combined, though the 
Forest Service was sued less than its 13-year average in 4 of the last 5 
years of record.  
 
 157 See infra Table 8.  
 158 See infra Table 8. 
 159 Calculated from the “Cases File” data provided in NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra 
note 14. 




 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total Filed 
Annual 
Mean 
Army Corps of Eng’rs 7 13 12 13 8 25 1 15 5 6 3 10 8 126 9.7 
Dep’t of Commerce 8 10 6 15 3 4 2 8 12 5 8 8 7 96 7.4 
Dep’t of Defense 4 3 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 3 0 1 0 25 1.9 
Dep’t of Energy 2 4 1 4 3 0 1 6 4 1 2 0 0 28 2.2 
Bureau of Indian 
Affairs & Nat’l Indian 
Gaming Comm’n 
3 3 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 1 0 1 1 19 1.5 
Bureau of Land Mgmt. 20 18 15 19 12 21 7 14 2 17 22 20 18 205 15.8 
Bureau of Reclamation 1 2 11 1 3 0 3 1 3 0 1 3 0 29 2.2 
Fish & Wildlife Serv. 17 12 2 5 3 6 3 6 0 6 4 5 16 85 6.5 
Nat’l Park Serv. 7 4 1 4 4 0 2 6 0 2 4 4 3 41 3.2 
Dep’t of the 
Interior, 
other agencies 
0 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 0 5 0 2 2 16 1.2 
Fed. Aviation 
Admin. 7 16 3 2 3 3 5 0 1 3 3 0 0 46 3.5 
Fed. Highway 
Admin. 3 10 6 11 5 7 4 9 12 10 14 4 1 96 7.4 
Fed. Transit 
Admin. 13 7 2 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 39 3.0 
Dep’t of Transp., 
other agency 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 0.5 
Envtl. Prot. Agency 4 1 0 6 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 21 1.6 
Federal Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n 0 0 0 2 4 2 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 16 1.2 
Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n 0 0 1 2 0 3 0 3 4 * 1 0 0 14 1.1 
Animal & Plant 
Health Inspection 
Serv. 
2 0 3 3 3 2 1 3 * 4 2 1 2 26 2.0 
Forest Serv. 40 40 66 76 50 30 40 46 42 18 25 25 28 526 40.5 
Dep’t of Agric., 
other agency         1    1 2 0.2 
Other 0 3 4 0 7 0 5 3 5 3 1 1 4 36 2.8 
All Agencies 138 147 140 166 120 108 86 132 97 87 94 88 96 1,499 115.3 
* data not reported by the CEQ 
Table 8: NEPA Case Filings in Federal Court, 2001–2013 
The high proportion of NEPA lawsuits against the Forest Service 
(35% of all NEPA lawsuits) may be partly explained by the large share 
of EISs produced by the Forest Service, which amounts to 26% of all 
Final and Supplemental Final EISs governmentwide.160 Clearly, 
however, the Forest Service’s share of NEPA litigation is greater than 
 
 160 EPA EIS Database, supra note 36.  
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its share of EIS production. In fact, we estimate that Forest Service 
NEPA decisions were challenged at almost three times the 
governmentwide rate, with 0.6% of all Forest Service NEPA reviews 
challenged,161 while only approximately 0.2% of governmentwide NEPA 
decisions were challenged.162 Moreover, other recent NEPA litigation 
scholarship found the Forest Service’s governmentwide share of EIS-
specific litigation was 1.4 times its share of EISs produced, meaning 
that Forest Service EISs were challenged in court approximately 40% 
more often than anticipated based on the number of EISs they 
completed.163 Perhaps one factor behind the Forest Service’s high 
litigation rates is the fact that the Forest Service prepares a higher 
percentage of EISs and fewer CEs than its sister agencies,164 which may 
indicate that its projects are anticipated to have a higher level of impact 
and therefore spark more intense public scrutiny.  
By comparison, between 2001 and 2013, the BLM was a defendant 
in 205 NEPA suits, averaging 15.8 per year and making up 13.7% of all 
NEPA lawsuits governmentwide..165 The Army Corps was the lead 
agency in 126 NEPA lawsuits, averaging 9.7 per year and making up 
8.4% of NEPA lawsuits governmentwide.166 The Federal Highway 
Administration and the Department of Commerce were the lead 
agencies in 96 lawsuits each, averaging 7.4 per year and each making 
up 6.4% of NEPA lawsuits.167 The FWS averaged 6.5 NEPA lawsuits per 
year, for a total of 85 NEPA lawsuits between 2001 and 2013, making 
up 5.7% of governmentwide NEPA lawsuits.168 The Federal Aviation 
Administration was the lead agency in 46 NEPA lawsuits, averaging 3.5 
NEPA lawsuits per year, and making up 3.1% of NEPA lawsuits 
governmentwide.169 The Park Service was the lead agency in 41 NEPA 
lawsuits, averaging 3.2 lawsuits per year, and making up 2.7% of 
governmentwide NEPA lawsuits per year.170 
 
 161 Our calculation uses the number of cases filed against the Forest Service (526), di-
vided by the estimated number of Forest Service NEPA decisions (84,950), which is based 
on the EPA’s data on the number of Draft, Final, and Supplemental Final EISs produced 
by the Forest Service (1699) and the GAO’s reporting that 2% of Forest Service NEPA re-
views are Final EISs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 9, at 8. 
 162 See supra Part IV.B.3 and text discussing NEPA decisions challenged in court.  
 163 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 30 tbl.1. Note that Adelman & Glicksman 
compare EISs produced to EIS lawsuits, whereas our comparison using CEQ data exam-
ines EISs produced to general NEPA lawsuits, not specifically lawsuits over EISs.  
 164 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 165 Calculated from the “Cases Filed” data provided in NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra 
note 14. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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The BLM produced 8.3% of Final and Supplemental Final EISs 
governmentwide,171 and recent NEPA scholarship found the BLM’s 
governmentwide share of EIS lawsuits was roughly equal to its share of 
EISs produced.172 We estimate that the BLM’s NEPA decisions (EISs, 
EAs, and CEs) were challenged 0.4% of the time,173 which is the same 
rate as the governmentwide average. The NPS produced 5.9% of Final 
and Supplemental Final EISs governmentwide between 2001 and 
2013.174 Based on our estimate of total NPS NEPA document production 
and the 41 NEPA lawsuits filed against the NPS, we estimate that only 
0.1% of all NPS NEPA decisions were challenged in court.175 Finally, the 
FWS produced 2.6% of all Final and Supplemental Final EISs 
governmentwide during that same time period.176 Based on an 
estimated 16,300 NEPA decisions over the analysis period and 85 NEPA 
lawsuits filed, we calculate that 0.5% of all of the Service’s NEPA 
decisions were challenged in court,177 more than twice the 
governmentwide average of 0.2%.178 However, because the overall 
number of NEPA lawsuits is low for the FWS, the agency’s NEPA 
litigation burden remained comparatively light.  
 
 171 Our calculation reflects the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared 
by the BLM (259) divided by the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared 
by all agencies (3,132). EPA EIS Database, supra note 36.  
 172 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 30 tbl.1.  
 173 Our calculation is the number of cases filed against the BLM (205), divided by the 
estimated number of the BLM’s NEPA decisions (53,600), which is based on the EPA’s da-
ta on the number of Draft, Final, and Supplemental Final EISs produced by the BLM 
(536) and the GAO’s estimate 1% of NEPA reviews governmentwide are Final EISs, as no 
BLM-specific estimate was available. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 
8. 
 174 Our calculation reflects the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared 
by the NPS (185) divided by the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared 
by all agencies (3,132). EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
 175 Our calculation of the number of the NPS’s NEPA decisions is based on the EPA’s 
data on the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs produced and the GAO’s esti-
mate 1% of NEPA reviews governmentwide are Final EISs, as no NPS-specific estimate 
was available. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. 
 176 Our calculation reflects the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared 
by the FWS (80) divided by the number of Final and Supplemental Final EISs prepared by 
all agencies (3,132). EPA EIS Database, supra note 36. 
 177 Our calculation of the number of FWS NEPA decisions is based on the EPA’s data on 
the number of Draft, Final, and Supplemental Final EISs produced by the FWS between 
2001 and 2013 (173) and the GAO’s estimate 1% of NEPA reviews governmentwide are 
Final EISs, as no FWS-specific estimate was available. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. As explained in Part IV.A.1, we reviewed BLM NEPA filings 
from 2005 through 2018 and found that just 0.43% of the BLM’s NEPA reviews involved 
an EIS. Extrapolating from these figures, we estimate that just 0.2% of all BLM NEPA 
decisions are challenged in court. We chose not to extrapolate from these figures in the 
body of this report because we do not know if the figures obtained from the BLM’s ePlan-
ning website are complete or indicative of averages over the entire study period. This high-
lights the importance of developing better mechanisms to track all NEPA decisions.  
 178 See supra Part IV.B.3 and text discussing NEPA decisions challenged in court. 
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It is also worth noting other NEPA litigation scholarship has found 
that agencies in charge of a significant amount of infrastructure work 
faced a lower share of EIS litigation than anticipated based on the 
number of EISs they produced. For example, the Federal Highway 
Administration’s share of EIS litigation was just 30% of what was 
anticipated based on the number of EISs it produced.179 Similarly, the 
Army Corps’ share of EIS litigation was half of that anticipated based 
on the number of EISs they produced.180 It is not clear whether these 
differences reflect differences in the level of scrutiny for particular 
projects or differences in the way agencies approach NEPA compliance. 
C. NEPA Litigation Outcomes 
This section looks at: 1) the rate at which the federal government 
wins, loses, and settles NEPA litigation; 2) the success rates of different 
types of NEPA documents in court rulings; 3) how litigation outcomes 
vary across agencies; and 4) how NEPA litigation success rates compare 
to outcomes in other federal environmental litigation in which the 
federal government is a defendant. We found that some agencies fare 
better than others in NEPA litigation, but overall, federal agencies 
prevail in NEPA litigation at rates comparable to other environmental 
matters in which the agencies are defendants. We also found that 
governmentwide, agency success rates in NEPA litigation are improving 
over time.  
1. NEPA Litigation “Win” Rates 
We examined the CEQ’s published NEPA Litigation Reports181 to 
calculate governmentwide and agency-level outcomes in three 
categories: “win,”182 “loss,”183 and “neutral.”184 Between 2001 and 2013, 
 
 179 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 30 tbl.1. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. The CEQ’s “Case Dispositions” data 
provides information on the type of relief granted.  
 182 “Wins” include rulings labelled by the CEQ as “judgment for defendant” and “dis-
missal without settlement.” This includes cases where the court found the agency had met 
its burden; cases that were decided favorably for the agency on justiciability, jurisdiction-
al, or procedural grounds; and when the plaintiffs withdrew their claim prior to a decision 
on the merits or when the plaintiff agreed to a voluntary dismissal. We count as a “win” 
any decision that resolved the matter in a way that did not call the agency’s NEPA com-
pliance efforts into question or require further action on the part of the lead agency even if 
the decision was not on the merits. 
 183 Federal government “losses” include rulings labeled by the CEQ as “remand” and 
“permanent injunction.” These rulings include when the federal government lost on the 
merits of a NEPA claim; and when the government withdrew the project, plan, or decision 
prior to a judicial decision on the merits, but where no settlement was listed. We treated 
voluntary withdrawal of a project by an agency as a “loss” because the proposed action 
could not proceed without further NEPA action on the part of the lead agency. This may 
slightly overstate government “losses” because a project proposed by a non-federal actor 
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the federal government “won” 63.3% of final outcomes in NEPA cases, 
“lost” 18.6% of the cases, and had neutral outcomes in 18.1% of the 
cases.185 Over the 13-year period studied, the federal government’s win 
rate in NEPA litigation increased overall (with some variation), and the 
government prevailed at above average rates in each of the past five 
years of record.186 The federal government’s loss rate was below the 13- 
year average in each of the past five years of record, and the rate of 
neutral outcomes also declined during each of the past five years.187 
Figure 5: NEPA Litigation Outcomes 2001–2013 
As shown in Table 9, the CEQ’s reports also include data on the 
number of Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and Preliminary 
Injunctions ordered by a reviewing court.188 Such temporary relief is 
 
could be withdrawn by that actor for reasons that have nothing to do with NEPA adequa-
cy. 
 184 Neutral outcomes include dismissals with settlement and outcomes labeled as “oth-
er” by the CEQ. Temporary relief was excluded from these calculations as such temporary 
relief does not reflect a final outcome.  
 185 These numbers are calculated by dividing the number of winning, losing, and neu-
tral outcomes by the total number of NEPA cases disposed of in that year.  
 186 See infra Figure 5 and Table 9. 
 187 See infra Figure 5 and Table 9. 
 188 The CEQ’s reports do not include data on the number of motions for a TRO or Pre-
liminary Injunction. We could not determine the rate at which preliminary relief was 
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% Fed Win % Neutral % Fed Loss
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important to note because it may delay implementation of agency 
actions. Between 2001 and 2013, plaintiffs in 128 NEPA lawsuits  
obtained temporary relief—either a TRO or a preliminary injunction.189 
We do not, however, consider these to be “losses” for the government as 
they merely maintain the status quo while litigation remains pending, 
and temporary relief does not indicate that the plaintiffs eventually 
prevailed on the merits.  
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
W
in 
Judgement for U.S. 66 49 49 50 94 84 87 77 76 46 79 46 29 832 
Dismissal w/o 




Order 5 2 4 4 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 23 
Preliminary Injunction 6 8 11 15 18 8 10 6 2 5 5 6 5 105 
Loss 
Permanent Injunction 9 19 7 7 7 16 18 10 15 4 3 0 3 118 
Remand 18 15 16 17 23 48 23 19 6 8 21 4 8 226 
O
ther 
Dismissal w/ Settlement 24 22 22 28 24 13 15 26 22 11 18 5 4 234 
Other 15 53 33 0          101 
Pending 135 168 205 251 24 195 168 233 271      
Table 9: NEPA Litigation Outcomes, 2001–2013 
2. Success Rates Based on Type of NEPA Review 
We used the CEQ’s published data to analyze the types of NEPA 
documents most often at issue in judicial decisions190 and the 
government’s success rates for each type of NEPA document.191 Unlike 
most of this Article, this section of our analysis is limited to 2005 
through 2013 because earlier data does not include information on all 
possible litigation outcomes. As shown in Table 10, when NEPA cases 
were decided on ripeness, mootness, standing grounds, subject matter 
jurisdiction, or personal jurisdiction, the federal government won 86.1% 
of the time.192 The federal government won 69.8% of the time when the 
question involved whether NEPA was required.193 When the adequacy of 
a CE was the basis for a court ruling, the federal government won 68.2% 
 
 189 See infra Table 9. 
 190 See supra Part IV.B.5 (discussing types of NEPA documents most often at issue). 
 191 Calculated using the “Basis for NEPA Dispositions” data provided in NEPA 
LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14.  
 192 See also Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 34–35 (finding that constitutional 
standing was the single most frequently litigated issue, but defendants were rarely suc-
cessful in bringing such a defense).  
 193 See infra Table 10. 
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of the time.194 The federal government won 62.3% of the time when EA 
adequacy was the basis for case disposition. When the court ruled on 
EIS adequacy, the federal government won 58.3% of the time.195 The 
federal government was the least successful when Supplemental EIS 
adequacy was challenged, winning those challenges 52.2% of the time.196  
Because we were working with aggregated data, we were unable to 
determine whether these differences were statistically significant. We 
note, however, that Adelman and Glicksman found an absence in 
statistically significant variation in success rates for different types of 
NEPA claims.197  
 
 194 Calculated from the “Basis for NEPA Dispositions” data provided from 2005 to 2013 
in NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14.  
 195 Calculated from the “Basis for NEPA Dispositions” data provided from 2005 to 2013 
in NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. This means that 41.7% of EISs that were 
subject to a court ruling on the merits were held inadequate. However, as a portion of final 
EISs produced, only 6.9% of final EISs were ruled inadequate. See infra Part IV.B.5 (dis-
cussing the portion of final EISs resulting in court rulings).  
 196 Calculated from the “Basis for NEPA Dispositions” data provided from 2005 to 2013 
in NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. However, as a portion of Supplemental EISs 
produced, only 15% of SEISs were ruled inadequate. See infra Part IV.B.5 (discussing the 
portion of supplemental final EISs resulting in court rulings).  
 197 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 34.  
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 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Jurisdictional 27 27 15 28 0 12 22 13 7 151 
Agency prevailed 25 14 12 27 0 12 20 13 7 130 
Plaintiff prevailed 2 13 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 21 
% Agency Win 92.6 51.9 80.0 96.4  100.0 90.9 100.0 100.0 86.1 
NEPA required? 13 4 14 3 4 3 8 0 4 53 
NEPA Not Required 9 4 10 3 2 1 4 0 4 37 
NEPA Required 4 0 4 0 2 2 4 0 0 16 
% Agency Win 69.2 100.0 71.4 100.0 50.0 33.3 50.0 -- 100.0 69.8 
CE Adequacy 12 13 13 8 5 5 10 0 0 66 
CE Adequate 10 9 7 5 5 4 5 0 0 45 
CE Inadequate 2 4 6 3 0 1 5 0 0 21 
% Agency Win 83.3 69.2 53.8 62.5 100.0 80.0 50.0   68.2 
EA Adequacy 44 50 29 23 28 16 29 5 7 231 
EA Adequate 24 27 14 14 23 11 24 2 5 144 
EA Inadequate 20 23 15 9 5 5 5 3 2 87 
% Agency Win 54.5 54.0 48.3 60.9 82.1 68.8 82.8 40.0 71.4 62.3 
EIS Adequacy 38 55 64 36 41 22 47 0 9 312 
EIS Adequate 25 29 29 21 21 17 32 0 8 182 
EIS Inadequate 13 26 35 15 20 5 15 0 1 130 
% Agency Win 65.8 52.7 45.3 58.3 51.2 77.3 68.1 -- 88.9 58.3 
SEIS Adequacy 7 18 15 9 6 2 7 0 3 67 
SEIS Adequate      1 1 0 3 5 
SEIS Not Needed 3 4 6 8 3 1 5 0 0 30 
SEIS Needed 4 14 9 1 3 0 1 0 0 32 
% Agency Win 42.9 22.2 40.0 88.9 50.0 100.0 85.7 -- 100.0 52.2 
Total 141 167 150 107 84 60 123 18 30 880 
Total Agency Wins 96 87 78 78 54 47 91 15 27 573 
Total % Agency Wins 68.1 52.1 52.0 72.9 64.3 78.3 74.0 83.3 90.0 65.1 
Table 10: NEPA Litigation Outcome Summary, 2005–2013 
3. NEPA Outcomes by Lead Agency 
In addition to calculating NEPA litigation outcomes on a 
governmentwide basis, we also examined the success rate of the eight 
agencies who are sued the most frequently over NEPA decisions. This 
information is displayed in Table 11. Because the CEQ’s published 
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summary reports on NEPA litigation198 lacked agency-level win–loss–
settle data, we obtained raw data from the CEQ to make these 
calculations,199 relying wherever possible on the CEQ’s labels of the type 
of relief granted and the basis for disposition (e.g., justiciability, 
adequacy of the NEPA decision, or other).200  
Overall, the eight most-sued agencies won slightly less often and 
had fewer neutral outcomes compared to the governmentwide averages. 
The most-sued agencies won 60.2% of NEPA litigation, lost 23.6% of 
NEPA litigation, and had neutral outcomes 10.3% of NEPA litigation. In 
comparison, the federal government overall won 63.3% of their cases, 
lost 18.6% of their cases, and had neutral outcomes 18.1% of the time.201 
 
 198 NEPA LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 14. 
 199 We contacted the CEQ and requested copies of the raw data that CEQ utilized to 
prepare the summary statistics that are posted on the CEQ website. The CEQ graciously 
shared this data, which is on file with the authors. For this agency-level breakdown, we 
omitted 2004 and 2005 data from our analysis because the CEQ’s raw data did not distin-
guish between sub-agencies within large departments (e.g., Department of Interior litiga-
tion did not distinguish between cases involving the BLM, the FWS, or the NPS). We 
chose not to make our own determinations of the lead agency by reexamining each case in 
court docket databases because cases often involved multiple defendant agencies and we 
could not ensure our labeling methods would be consistent with those used by the CEQ for 
the other nine years of data.  
 200 Although we relied on the CEQ’s labeling to the maximum extent possible, some of 
the CEQ’s agency-level raw data labels were unclear, forcing us to make occasional 
judgement calls. For example, the CEQ’s raw data occasionally labeled outcomes as 
“mixed rulings,” rather than as one of the outcome categories that would allow us to clear-
ly find a win, loss, or neutral. In these situations, we did not code a win/loss/neutral label, 
but instead counted those cases as unlabeled “others” in the total number of rulings for 
that year. On average, 5.4% of rulings were “other,” while the annual average ranges from 
0.8% to 7.9% of rulings. Due to the inclusion of these unlabeled other outcomes, some win
/loss/neutral percentages for individual agencies total to less than 100%.  It was also occa-
sionally unclear from the CEQ’s labeling whether remands at the appellate level were fa-
vorable or unfavorable for the government. In such instances, we found the court opinions, 
identified the district court ruling, and determined whether the appellate outcome for the 
NEPA claim was favorable or unfavorable to the government. 
 201 The total number of dispositions shown in Table 11 (1,850) is greater than the total 
number of dispositions in Table 8 (1,499) because multiple rulings may have occurred in 
the same case. The government, for example, may have lost a motion to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds only to later prevail on NEPA adequacy.  
2020] MEASURING THE BURDEN 517 
 
Agency Final Rulings % Lost % Neutral % Win 
Army Corps of Engineers 131 24.4 9.2 65.6 
NOAA & National Marine Fisheries 
Service 114 20.2 7.9 64.0 
BLM 175 27.4 11.4 56.0 
FWS 80 16.3 10.0 71.3 
NPS 41 31.7 14.6 51.2 
Fed. Aviation  
Administration 57 10.5 10.5 73.7 
Fed. Highway  
Administration 104 15.4 8.7 70.2 
Forest Service 520 26.3 10.8 55.0 
Total for Eight  
Most-Sued Agencies 1,222 23.6 10.3 60.2 
All Federal Agencies 1,850 18.6 18.1 63.3 
Table 11: NEPA Outcomes by Lead Agency 
Of the most-sued agencies, the Federal Aviation Administration 
was the agency most likely to prevail in litigation, with 73.7% of its 
NEPA litigation resulting in a win, 10.5% in a loss, and 10.5% in a 
neutral outcome. The FWS also fared well, with 71.3% of its NEPA 
litigation resulting in a win, 16.3% in a loss, and 10% in a neutral 
outcome. The Federal Highway Administration was close behind, 
winning 70.2% of its NEPA litigation, losing 15.4%, and having a 
neutral outcome in 8.7% of cases.  
The Army Corps and NOAA/National Marine Fisheries Service won 
65.6% and 64% of NEPA litigation, respectively. The BLM and the 
Forest Service won their NEPA litigation 56% and 55% of the time, 
respectively, and lost 27.4% and 26.3% of the time, respectively.202 The 
NPS was the least successful agency—winning the least, losing the 
most, and having more neutral outcomes than any of the top eight most-
sued agencies. The NPS won its NEPA litigation just 51.2% of cases, lost 
31.7%, and had neutral outcomes 14.6% of the time.  
Our agency-level success findings based on the CEQ’s reporting 
differs from that of other recent NEPA litigation scholarship, which 
found that the rate at which plaintiffs prevailed was largely uniform 
across agencies and types of claims raised, and any variation observed 
was more generally correlated with the presidential administration in 
 
 202 For comparison to the CEQ’s data, an article examining Forest Service NEPA litiga-
tion with published opinions issued between 1970 and 2001 found that the “Forest Service 
won 60%, lost 20%, and had other judgements in 20%” of NEPA cases brought against 
them. Broussard & Whitaker, supra note 43, at 137. That article also examined the type of 
NEPA document at issue in Forest Service NEPA litigation and found that, at the district 
court level, 55% of decisions involved cases where plaintiffs argued that an EA or EIS 
should have been prepared, and 36% of cases involved an inadequate EA or EIS. Id. at 
138; see also Miner et al., supra note 43, at 116, 122 (finding that the Forest Service won 
51.5% of land management litigation between 1989 and 2008, and won NEPA claims 
69.3% of the time). 
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charge and the political affiliation of the president who appointed the 
judges making the decisions.203   
4. NEPA Litigation Outcomes Compared to Other Federal Cases 
To put NEPA litigation into context, we examined data published 
by the Office of the United States Attorneys.204 We analyzed the 
outcomes of all civil litigation in which the federal government was a 
party, as well as civil litigation over environmental or lands issues 
where the federal government was a defendant.205 Unfortunately, coding 
differences between the CEQ’s NEPA litigation reporting and the Office 
of U.S. Attorneys’ general civil litigation reporting preclude a direct 
comparison between the two data sets.  
As displayed in Table 12, data from the Office of U.S. Attorneys 
labels 30.7% of civil litigation cases handled by the U.S. Attorney 
between 2001 and 2013 as an “other” outcome—i.e. neither a win, loss, 
settlement, or dismissal. This results in a paradoxical outcome wherein 
the federal government wins less and loses less in civil litigation over all 
matters than it does in NEPA litigation, while settlement rates are 
largely equal to neutral outcomes in NEPA litigation. Including 
dismissals, the federal government won206 just 41.4% of all civil 
litigation between 2001 and 2013207 (whereas the government won 
63.3% of NEPA litigation208). However, the federal government also only 
lost 10.8% of civil cases (whereas it lost 18.6% of NEPA cases209). The 
federal government settled 17.2% of its civil cases during that same time 
period (while it had neutral outcomes in 18.1% of NEPA cases210). 
 
 203 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 25. 
 204 Annual Statistical Reports, supra note 76.  
 205 We limited our analysis to cases where the federal government was a defendant be-
cause NEPA litigation is unlikely to be initiated by a federal agency. Focusing on other 
cases where federal agencies are a defendant therefore ensures that we are comparing like 
cases. 
 206 Wins include judgements for the government and dismissals.  
 207 See infra Table 12. 
 208 See supra Table 11. 
 209 See supra Table 11. 
 210 See supra Table 11. 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Avg. 
For U.S. 29.6 30.7 31.7 30.2 33.6 33.4 30.8 29.4 30.6 27.6 25.3 28.5 26.3 29.7 
Settled 23.1 21.6 22.8 21.2 19.6 19.9 16.2 14.5 14.4 14.7 13.9 13.2 10.3 17.2 
Against 
U.S. 9.9 9.4 9.2 10.2 11.0 10.3 10.3 16.1 12.2 9.3 9.3 12.8 9.0 10.8 
Dismiss 8.2 8.3 9.3 9.6 11.5 11.0 14.0 12.1 13.4 13.5 14.1 14.3 12.0 11.6 
Other 29.1 29.9 27.1 28.9 24.2 25.4 28.7 27.9 29.4 34.9 37.3 31.3 42.4 30.7 
Total 74,558 77,141 75,434 76,949 78,154 68,858 67,047 87,481 80,261 77,934 81,245 78,229 89,120  
Table 12: Civil Litigation Outcomes in Civil Cases Handled by 
U.S. Attorneys in District Court, 2001–2013 
In order to address the unknown nature of the “other” 
categorization, we excluded “other” outcomes and recalculated the 
government’s success rate. When we excluded “other” outcomes from the 
analysis, we find that the federal government prevails in civil cases 
handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Office 59.7% of the time, settles 24.8% of 
these cases, and loses 15.5% of the cases.211 By comparison, the federal 
government won 63.3% of its NEPA cases from 2001 through 2013, had 
neutral outcomes in 18.1% of these cases, and lost 18.6% of its NEPA 
cases.212  
When focusing on general environmental and land use litigation in 
which it is a defendant, the federal government also wins less and loses 
less and settles less than it does in NEPA-specific litigation. The federal 
government won just 41.6% of all environmental and lands litigation in 
which it was involved between 2001 and 2013.213 However, it also only 
lost 6.4% of such cases.214 The federal government settled 11.2% of its 
environmental and lands cases during that same time period, leaving a 
significant portion of such cases (40.8%) with an unknown “other” class 
of outcome, as shown in Table 13.  
When we exclude “other” outcomes we find that the federal 
government prevails in 70.3% of environmental and lands cases in 
which it is a defendant, settles 18.9% of those cases, and loses 10.8% of 
the time. As noted above, the federal government won 63.3% of its 
NEPA cases from 2001 through 2013, had neutral outcomes in 18.1% of 







 211 Annual Statistical Reports, supra note 76. 
 212 See supra Table 11. 
 213 Annual Statistical Reports, supra note 76. 
 214 Id. 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Avg. 
For U.S. 22.4 21.5 30.0 34.9 31.3 31.3 29.4 28.7 24.4 22.2 25.4 25.2 25.3 27.0 
Settled 13.3 10.5 10.0 12.2 12.2 10.7 9.5 12.6 11.8 15.3 9.5 8.0 7.8 11.2 
Against 
U.S. 7.0 5.3 7.9 5.9 8.2 7.7 7.0 5.4 3.9 5.8 5.2 5.4 8.0 6.4 
Dismiss 17.0 15.6 16.1 14.6 12.0 10.0 17.4 13.0 17.2 13.8 13.2 13.1 14.5 14.6 
Other 40.3 47.1 36.1 32.5 36.3 40.4 36.7 40.4 42.7 42.9 46.6 48.3 44.4 40.8 
Total 670 646 621 542 534 431 472 485 459 464 401 389 387  
Table 13: Civil Litigation Outcomes, Environmental/Lands 
Matters, U.S. as a Defendant, 2001–2013215 
Regardless of whether we include the “other” category in 
calculating the federal government’s overall win rates in civil litigation 
and environmental-specific litigation, these rates differ slightly from 
NEPA-specific litigation outcomes using the CEQ’s data. While our 
results differ somewhat from the findings contained in a recent study 
from Professors Adelman and Glicksman, we do find that the federal 
government prevails in the majority of cases. In their study, Adelman 
and Glicksman examined NEPA litigation using a database created 
specifically for that project. That study observed that plaintiffs prevail 
in NEPA litigation at rates similar to those in other challenges to 
federal agency actions.216 That study also noted that the federal 
government wins around 70% of challenges to agency actions.217  
Adelman and Glicksman’s study observed that environmental 
plaintiffs won substantially more often than other plaintiffs in NEPA 
litigation at both the district court and on appeal.218 This appears to 
indicate that environmental plaintiffs are more selective than their 
peers in deciding whether to engage in NEPA litigation, which 
contradicts arguments that environmental plaintiffs are making 
frivolous claims in order to unnecessarily delay federal projects.  
 
 215 Id. 
 216 Adelman & Glicksman, supra note 12, at 27–28.  
 217 See id. at 27–28 n.111 (looking at the success rates for challenges to agency action 
from various empirical studies, citing Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real 
World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767–68 (2008) (“reporting data on 
administrative review cases involving EPA indicating that agencies prevailed on average 
72% of administrative challenges on appeal”); Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An Em-
pirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 515, 515 (2011) (“observing that ‘[c]ourts at all levels of the federal judiciary uphold 
agency actions in about 70% of cases’ irrespective of the standard of review that they ap-
ply’”); Richard J. Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 
63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 84–85 (2011) (“synthesizing the results of numerous empirical stud-
ies of judicial review and finding that agencies prevail in 64% to 81% of the cases at the 
circuit level”)).  
 218 Id. at 27 (noting that environmental plaintiffs win 35% of NEPA cases at the district 
court and 27% on appeal, while other plaintiffs win just 16% of NEPA cases at the district 
court and only 14% on appeal).  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The vast majority of federal actions that are subject to NEPA 
review are evaluated through an expedited analysis contained in either 
a CE (95%)219 or an EA (5%).220 Less than 1% of federal actions require 
an EIS.221 Overall, just 0.22% of NEPA actions—or 1 in 450—result in 
litigation, and NEPA litigation represents just 0.043% of all civil 
environmental litigation in which the federal government is a 
defendant.222 The rate at which NEPA decisions are challenged in court 
is also generally in decline. The volume of NEPA litigation simply does 
not appear unduly burdensome, especially given the important dual 
goals of reducing environmental impacts and fostering public 
involvement in federal decisions impacting the environment.  
While EISs are more likely to result in litigation than either EAs or 
CEs, this should not come as a surprise because EISs are reserved for 
the most complex, contentious, and impactive 1% of federal projects. 
Even so, both the number of EISs completed annually and the volume of 
NEPA litigation are declining while federal agencies are prevailing in 
litigation at an increasing rate. Environmental plaintiffs appear to be 
quite selective in the cases that they bring, given both the small number 
of suits brought annually and their record of prevailing at a higher rate 
than non-environmental plaintiffs. This finding contradicts claims that 
environmental organizations are abusing the courts by the frequent 
filing of frivolous claims.  
NEPA litigation, in short, does not appear unduly burdensome. 
This is not to say that there is no room for NEPA reform, but rather, 
that efforts to reduce litigation or expedite production of NEPA 
documents are likely to have limited benefit while potentially 
undermining important national goals. Streamlining NEPA also runs a 
risk of actually delaying project implementation if, as our analysis 
suggests, the rate of challenge is inversely related to the time spent on 
the NEPA analysis. We therefore encourage Congress, the CEQ, and 
other agencies that are contemplating revisions to NEPA’s 
implementing regulations to look beyond impassioned rhetoric and 
ensure that any reform efforts are based on sound data.  
Having taken a hard look at NEPA litigation, our conclusions and 
recommendations are twofold: First, our analysis of the CEQ’s NEPA 
completion time data, NEPA litigation data, and U.S. Attorneys’ Office 
data on all federal civil litigation demonstrates that the attacks against 
NEPA and NEPA litigation focus on a nonexistent problem. Second, we 
nonetheless recognize that there is still room for improvement and 
suggest that any improvements made should be based on hard data, not 
 
 219 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See supra Table 4 (comparing the number of NEPA lawsuits filed to the total num-
ber of civil lawsuits against the federal government). 
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anecdotes. In order to make better data-driven decisions, agencies need 
complete and accurate data. As previously noted, the EPA provides a 
complete record of published EISs, but there is not a similar repository 
of statistics on other types of NEPA documents (EAs and CEs), and 
“data collection efforts vary by agency.”223 The inconsistency in record-
keeping among agencies, and the lack of a centralized repository of 
NEPA documents, or even a record of the number of NEPA actions by 
agency, is problematic because an estimated 99% of all NEPA reviews 
occur via CEs and EAs.224 Therefore, any NEPA reform should begin 
with an effort to increase and standardize NEPA document data 
collection and publication across all agencies. We found the BLM’s 
ePlanning website225 to be easy to use and believe that it could provide a 
model for other agencies. In addition, we recommend that the CEQ re-
initiate its lapsed data collecting efforts on NEPA litigation and 
designate a staff person to maintain these records and standardize the 
labelling of litigation outcomes, document types, and agencies.  
We also recommend amending agency guidelines and rules that 
impose strict deadlines and page limits on EISs, as expedited NEPA 
analysis appears more likely to result in litigation. While we lack the 
data needed to test whether fast-tracked NEPA projects fare less well 
when challenged, we suspect that to be the case because regardless of 
streamlining efforts, the test of NEPA adequacy remains whether the 
agency took a hard look at the issues. Satisfying the same standard 






 223 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 7. 
 224 Id. at 8. 
 225 ePlanning Project Search, supra note 75.  
